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Abstract
Recently, we proposed a framework for verification of agents’ abilities in asynchronous
multi-agent systems, together with an algorithm for automated reduction of models.
The semantics was built on the modeling tradition of distributed systems. As we
show here, this can sometimes lead to paradoxical interpretation of formulas when
reasoning about the outcome of strategies. First, the semantics disregards finite paths,
and thus yields counterintuitive evaluation of strategies with deadlocks. Secondly,
the semantic representations do not allow to capture the asymmetry between active
agents and the recipients of their choices. We propose how to avoid the problems by
a suitable change of the semantics, and prove that the model reduction scheme still
works in the modified framework.
Keywords: Alternating-time temporal logic; asynchronous interaction; semantics;
model checking; partial order reduction
1 Introduction
Modal logics of strategic ability. Alternating-time temporal logic ATL∗ [5]
is probably the most popular logic to describe interaction of agents in multi-
agent systems (MAS). Formulas of ATL∗ allow to express statements about
what agents (or groups of agents) can achieve. For example, 〈〈taxi〉〉G¬fatality
says that the autonomous cab can drive in such a way that nobody is ever killed,
and 〈〈taxi, passg〉〉F destination expresses that the cab and the passenger have
a joint strategy to arrive at the destination, no matter what any other agents
do. Such statements allow to express important functionality and security
requirements in a simple and intuitive way. Moreover, algorithms and tools for
verification of strategic abilities have been in constant development for almost
20 years [2,1,31,35,15,11,42,27,13,34,14,7,6]. Still, there are two caveats.
1 Contact email: jamroga@ipipan.waw.pl . The authors acknowledge the support of NCBR
Poland and FNR Luxembourg, under the PolLux/FNR-CORE project STV (POLLUX-
VII/1/2019).
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First, all the realistic scenarios of agent interaction, that one may want
to specify and verify, involve imperfect information. That is, the agents in
the system do not always know exactly the global state of the system, and
thus they have to make their decisions based on their local view of the situa-
tion. Unfortunately, verification of agents with imperfect information is hard
to very hard – more precisely, ∆P
2
-complete to undecidable, depending on the
syntactic and semantic variant of the logic [45,25,21]. Also, the imperfect infor-
mation semantics of ATL∗ does not admit alternation-free fixpoint character-
izations [10,19,20], which makes incremental synthesis of strategies impossible,
or at least difficult to achieve [42,11,27,12,28].
Secondly, the semantics of strategic logics are traditionally based on syn-
chronous concurrent game models. In other words, one implicitly assumes the
existence of a global clock that triggers subsequent global events in the system.
At each tick of the clock, all the agents choose their actions, and the system
proceeds accordingly with the corresponding global transition. However, many
real-life systems are inherently asynchronous, and do not operate on a global
clock that perfectly synchronizes the atomic steps of all the components. More-
over, many systems that are synchronous at the implementation level can be
more conveniently modeled as asynchronous on a more abstract level. In many
scenarios, both aspects combine. For example, when modeling an election, one
must take into account both the truly asynchronous nature of events happening
at different polling stations, and the best level of granularity for modeling the
events happening within a single polling station.
Asynchronous semantics and partial-order reduction. In a recent
work [30], we have proposed how to adapt the semantics of ATL∗ to asyn-
chronous models. We also showed that the technique of partial order reduction
(POR) [38,39,40,24,23,32,33] can be adapted to verification of strategic abili-
ties in asynchronous MAS with imperfect information and imperfect recall. In
fact, the (almost 30 years old) POR for linear time logic LTL can be taken
off the shelf and applied to a significant part of ATL∗ir, the variant of ATL
∗
based on memoryless strategies with imperfect information. This is extremely
important, as the practical verification of asynchronous systems badly suffers
from the state- and transition-space explosion resulting from interleaving of lo-
cal transitions. POR allows to reduce the models significantly, sometimes even
as much as exponentially. While the result is appealing, there is a sting in its
tail.
As we show here, the ATL∗ semantics for asynchronous agents, proposed
in [30], leads to paradoxical interpretation of strategic properties. This has
at least two reasons. First, the semantics disregards finite paths. In con-
sequence, it evaluates some intuitively losing strategies as winning, and vice
versa. Secondly, the representations and their execution semantics (inherited
from theory of concurrent systems [43]) do not allow to capture the asymme-
try between active agents and the ones that are influenced by their choices.
In this paper, we identify the problems on simple examples, and show how to
avoid them by extending the class of representations and changing slightly the
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execution semantics of strategies. More precisely, we add “silent” ǫ-transitions
in the models and on outcome paths of strategies, and allow for nondetermin-
istic choices in the agents’ protocol functions. Furthermore, we prove that the
partial-order reduction method is still correct in the modified framework.
Motivation. The variant of ATL∗ for asynchronous systems in [30] was pro-
posed mainly as a framework for formal verification. This was backed by the
results showing that submits to partial-order reduction. However, a verification
framework is only useful if it allows to specify requirements in an intuitive way,
so that the property we think we are verifying is indeed the one being verified.
In this paper, we show that this was not the case. We also propose how to
overcome the problems without spoiling the efficient reduction scheme.
2 Models of Multi-Agent Systems
We first recall the models of asynchronous interaction in MAS, proposed in [30]
and inspired by [43,22,33].
2.1 Asynchronous Multi-Agent Systems
In logical approaches to MAS, one usually assumes synchronous actions of all
the agents [5,45]. However, many agent systems are inherently asynchronous,
or it is useful to model them without assuming precise timing relationships
between the actions of different agents. As an example, consider a team of
logistic robots running in a factory [44]. Often no global clock is available to
all the robots, and even if there is one, the precise relative timing for robots
operating in different places is usually irrelevant.
Such a system can be conveniently represented with a set of automata that
execute asynchronously by interleaving local transitions, and synchronize their
moves whenever a shared event occurs. This modeling approach is standard in
theory of concurrent systems, where it dates back at least to the early 1980s and
the idea of APA Nets (asynchronous, parallel automata nets) [43]. The idea is
to represent the behavior of each component by a finite automaton where the
nodes correspond to the local states of the component. The transitions in the
automaton are labeled by the events in which the component can take part.
Then, the global behavior of the system is obtained by the interleaving of local
transitions, assuming that, in order for an event to occur, all the corresponding
components must execute it in their automata. This motivates the following
definition.
Definition 2.1 [Asynchronous MAS] An asynchronous multi-agent system
(AMAS) S consists of n agents Agt = {a1, . . . , an}, 2 each associated with
a tuple Ai = (Li, ιi,Evt i, Pi, Ti) including a set of possible local states
Li = {l1i , l
2
i , . . . , l
ni
i }, an initial state ιi ∈ Li, and a set of events Evt i =
{α1i , α
2
i , . . . , α
mi
i }. Let Evt =
⋃
i∈Agt Evt i be the set of all events, and
Loc =
⋃
i∈Agt Li be the set of all local states in the system. For each event
2 We do not consider the environment component, which may be added with no technical
difficulty.
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Fig. 1. Simple asynchronous MAS (agents sc, gc, and oc) and its canonical IIS Mconf
α ∈ Evt , Agent(α) = {i ∈ Agt | α ∈ Evt i} is the set of agents which have α in
their repertoires.
A local protocol Pi : Li → 2Evti \ ∅ selects the events available at each local
state. Moreover, Ti : Li × Evt i ⇀ Li is a (partial) local transition function
such that Ti(li, α) is defined iff α ∈ Pi(li). That is, Ti(l, α) indicates the result
of executing event α in local state l from the perspective of agent i.
Finally, we assume that each agent i in the AMAS is endowed with a set of
its local propositions PVi, and their valuation Vi : Li → 2PVi . Additionally, the
overall set of propositions PV =
⋃
i∈Agt PVi collects all the local propositions.
As our working example, we use a simple conference scenario.
Example 2.2 [Conference in times of epidemic] Consider the AMAS in Fig-
ure 1, consisting of the Steering Committee Chair (sc), the General Chair (gc),
and the Organizing Committee Chair (oc). Faced with the Covid-19 epidemics,
the SC chair can decide to give up the conference, or send a signal to gc to
proceed and open the meeting. The General Chair can spend any amount of
time preparing the conference before receiving the call to proceed. Afterwards,
gc and oc jointly decide whether the conference will by run in site or online.
In the former case, the epidemiologic risk is obviously much higher than in the
latter, indicated by the atomic proposition epid.
The set of events, the agents’ protocols, and the valuation of atomic propo-
sitions can be easily read from the graph. For easier reading, all the private
events are shown in grey. Note that event proceed is shared by agents sc and
gc, and can only be executed jointly. Similarly, events insite and online can
only be executed by gc and oc together. All the other events are private, and
do not require synchronization.
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2.2 Interleaved Interpreted Systems
To understand the interaction between asynchronous agents, we use the stan-
dard execution semantics from concurrency models, i.e., interleaving with syn-
chronization on shared events. To this end, we unfold the network of local
automata (i.e., AMAS) to a single automaton based on the notions of global
states and global transitions, defined formally below.
Definition 2.3 [Interleaved Interpreted System] Let PV be a set of proposi-
tional variables. An interleaved interpreted system (IIS), or a model, is an asyn-
chronous MAS extended with the following elements: a set St ⊆ L1× · · · ×Ln
of global states, an initial state ι ∈ St, a partial global transition function
T : St × Evt ⇀ St, and a valuation of propositions V : St → 2PV . For state
g = (l1, . . . , ln), we denote the local component of agent i by g
i = li. Also, we
will sometimes write g1
α
−→ g2 instead of T (g1, α) = g2.
We show in Definition 2.4 how to generate such a model for a given asyn-
chronous multi-agent system.
Definition 2.4 [Canonical IIS] Let S be an asynchronous MAS with n agents.
Its canonical model IIS(S) is the model extending S so that: (i) the initial state
is ι = (ι1, . . . , ιn); (ii) the transition function T is defined by T (g1, α) = g2 iff
Ti(g
i
1, α) = g
i
2 for all i ∈ Agent(α) and g
i
1 = g
i
2 for all i ∈ Agt \ Agent(α);
(iii) the set of global states St ⊆ L1 × . . . × Ln collects all the states reach-
able from ι by T . Moreover, the global valuation of propositions is defined as
V (l1, . . . , ln) = Vi(li).
Intuitively, the global states in IIS(S) can be seen as the possible config-
urations of local states of all the agents. Moreover, the transitions are labeled
by events that can be synchronously selected (in the current configuration) by
all the agents that have the event in their repertoire. Clearly, private events
(i.e., events such that Agent(α) is a singleton) require no synchronization.
Example 2.5 The canonical IIS for the asynchronous MAS of Example 2.2 is
shown in Figure 1.
We say that event α ∈ Evt is enabled at g ∈ St if g
α
−→ g′ for some g′ ∈ St.
The set of events enabled at g is denoted by enabled(g). The global transition
function is assumed to be total, i.e., at each g ∈ St there exists at least one
enabled event.
IIS can be used to provide an execution semantics to AMAS, and conse-
quently provide us with models for reasoning about AMAS.
3 Reasoning about Abilities: ATL*
Alternating-time temporal logic ATL∗ [3,5,45] generalizes the branching-time
temporal logic CTL∗ [16] by replacing the path quantifiers E,A with strategic
modalities 〈〈A〉〉. While the semantics of ATL∗ is typically defined for models
of synchronous systems, a variant for asynchronous MAS was proposed recently
in [30]. We summarize the main points in this section.
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3.1 Syntax
Let PV be a set of propositional variables and Agt the set of all agents. The
language of ATL∗ is defined as below.
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉γ, γ ::= ϕ | ¬γ | γ ∧ γ | X γ | γ U γ,
where p ∈ PV, A ⊆ Agt, X stands for “next,” and U for “strong until.”
The other Boolean operators are defined as usual. “Release” can be defined as
γ1R γ2 ≡ ¬((¬γ1)U (¬γ2)). The “sometime” and “always” operators can be
defined as F γ ≡ true U γ and G γ ≡ false R γ. Moreover, the CTL∗ operator
“for all paths” can be defined as Aγ ≡ 〈〈∅〉〉γ.
Example 3.1 Formula 〈〈sc〉〉F open expresses that the Steering Chair can bring
about opening the conference. Moreover, formula 〈〈gc, oc〉〉G¬epid says that the
General Chair and the Organizing Chair have a joint strategy to avoid high
epidemiological risk.
3.2 Strategies and Outcomes
A memoryless imperfect information strategy for i is a function σi : Li → Evt i
st. σi(l) ∈ Pi(l) for each l ∈ Li. We denote the set of such strategies by Σir.
A collective strategy σA for a coalition A = (a1, . . . , am) ⊆ Agt is a tuple of
strategies, one per agent i ∈ A. The set of A’s collective ir strategies is denoted
by ΣirA. We will sometimes use σA(g) = (σa1(g), . . . , σam(g)) to denote the
tuple of A’s choices at state g.
An infinite sequence of global states and events π = g0α0g1α1g2 . . . is called
an (interleaved) path if gi
αi−→ gi+1 for every i ≥ 0. Evt(π) = α0α1α2 . . . is
the sequence of events in π, and π[i] = gi is the i-th global state of π. ΠM (g)
denotes the set of all paths inM starting at g. Intuitively, the outcome of σA in
g is the set of all the infinite paths that can occur when the agents in A follow
σA and the agents in Agt \ A follow their protocols. To define it formally, we
first refine the concept of an enabled event, taking into account the choices of
A.
Definition 3.2 [Enabled events] Let A = (a1, . . . , am), g ∈ St, and
−→α A =
(α1, . . . , αm) be a selection of events such that every αi ∈ Pai(g). We say that
event β ∈ Evt is enabled by −→αA at g ∈ St iff
• for every ai ∈ Agent(β) ∩ A, we have β = αai , and
• for every i ∈ Agent(β) \A, it holds that β ∈ Pi(gi).
That is, β must be executable for all the involved agents even when −→α A has
been selected by A. We denote the set of such events by enabled(g,−→αA).
Clearly, enabled(g,−→α A) ⊆ enabled(g).
Definition 3.3 [Outcome paths] The outcome of strategy σA ∈ ΣirA in state
g ∈ St is the set outM (g, σA) ⊆ ΠM (g) such that π = g0α0g1α1g2 · · · ∈
outM (g, σA) iff g0 = g, and ∀i ∈ N αi ∈ enabled(π[i], σA(π[i])).
One often wants to look only at paths that do not consistently ignore
an agent whose choice is always enabled. Formally, a path π satisfies the
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concurrency-fairness condition (CF) if there is no event α enabled in all states
of π from π[n] on, such that for every event αi actually executed in π[i],
i = n, n + 1, . . . , we have Agent(α) ∩ Agent(αi) = ∅. We denote the set of
all such paths starting at g by ΠCFM (g).
Definition 3.4 [CF-outcome] The CF-outcome of σA ∈ ΣirA is defined as
outCFM (g, σA) = outM (g, σA) ∩ Π
CF
M (g).
3.3 Strategic Ability for Asynchronous Systems
The semantics ofATL∗ir in asynchronous MAS is defined by the following clause
for strategic modalities [30]:
M, g |=
ir
〈〈A〉〉γ iff there is a strategy σA ∈ ΣirA s.t. outM (g, σA) 6= ∅ and, for
each path π ∈ outM (g, σA), we have M,π |=ir γ.
The clauses for Boolean connectives and temporal operators are standard.
Moreover, the concurrency-fair semantics |=
irF
of ATL and ATL∗ is obtained
by replacing outM (g, σA) with out
CF
M (g, σA) in the above clause. We refer to
the logic under this semantics as ATL∗irF.
Example 3.5 Clearly, formula 〈〈gc, oc〉〉G¬epid holds in the conference model
Mconf , in the ir as well as irF semantics. To achieve that, it suffices that both
gc and oc choose online as part of their respective strategies. Note also that
Mconf , 000 6|=ir 〈〈sc〉〉F open because, even for the Steering Chair’s strategy that
selects proceed, the General Chair’s action prepare might be executed forever.
On the other hand, Mconf , 000 |=irF 〈〈sc〉〉F open, i.e., the Steering Chair can
effectively open the conference under the CF assumption.
Unfortunately, the semantics proposed in [30] leads to counter-intuitive in-
terpretation of strategic formulas. We discuss it in the subsequent sections.
4 Paradoxes and How to Avoid Them
In formal reasoning, paradoxes arise when a logical system is mathematically
consistent, but allows to derive statements that do not fit our understanding of
the problem domain. He, we describe two kinds of paradoxes that follow from
the semantics of ATL from [30], presented in Section 3. We also show how to
modify the semantics, and avoid the paradoxical interpretation of formulas.
4.1 Deadlock Strategies and Finite Paths
An automata network is typically required to produce no deadlock states, i.e.,
every global state in its unfolding must have at least one outgoing transition.
Then, all the maximal paths are infinite, and it is natural to refer to only infinite
paths in the semantics of temporal operators. In case of AMAS, the situation
is more delicate. Even if the AMAS as a whole produces no deadlocks, it might
be the case that some of the strategies do, which makes the interpretation of
strategic modalities cumbersome. We illustrate this on the following example.
Example 4.1 Consider the 3-agent AMAS of Figure 1, together with its un-
folding Mconf (i.e., its canonical IIS). Clearly, the IIS has no deadlock states.
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Fig. 2. A strategy in the conference scenario. In the agent modules, the joint strategy
of agents {gc, oc} is highlighted. In the resulting interpreted system, we highlight the
enabled transitions and reachable states.
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Fig. 3. ASV1,2: voter v1 (left) and coercer c (right)
Let us now look at the collective strategies of coalition {gc, oc}, with agent sc
serving as the opponent. It is easy to see that the coalition has no way to
prevent the opening of the conference, i.e., it cannot prevent the system from
reaching state 101. However, the strategy depicted in Figure 2 produces only
one infinite path, namely (000 giveup 002 giveup . . . ). Since the ATL seman-
tics in Section 3 disregards finite paths, we get that M, 000 |= 〈〈1, 2〉〉G¬fail,
which is counterintuitive.
Things can get even trickier. In particular, it may happen that the outcome
of a strategy is empty, which leads to situations where the intuitive meaning of a
strategic formula differs significantly from its formal semantics. To demonstrate
that, we use an election scenario inspired by [29, Example 1].
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Example 4.2 [Asynchronous Simple Voting] Vote-buying and coercion are
among the most important threats to democratic procedures. A very simple
variant of coercion can be modeled as follows. There are k voters (v1, . . . , vk),
each choosing one of n candidates (j = a, b, . . . ), and a single coercer c. A
voter proceeds by casting a vote for the selected candidate (event votei,j). We
assume that the system provides the voter with some kind of receipt, which
can be later used to demonstrate how she has voted. After the vote, she is
asked by the coercer to prove that she obeyed his prior request. The voter can
choose to provide the coercer with a ballot receipt (event gvi,j), or refuse to
give it (event ngi). After that, the voter ends her participation in the election
(event stopi).
The coercer initially waits for the receipt-related events gvi,j and ngi. After
seeing that voter i has terminated (event stopi), he may choose to punish the
voter (puni), or refrain from the punishment (npi). We denote the variant of
Asynchronous Simple Voting with k voters and n candidates by ASVk,n. An
AMAS modeling the scenario for k = 1 and n = 2 is presented in Figure 3.
Clearly, IIS(ASV1,2), q
1
0q
c
0 |= 〈〈v1〉〉F voted1,a in both ir and irF semantics.
Note, however, that all the joint memoryless strategies of v1 and the coercer
produce only finite sequences of transitions. This is because c must choose a
single event at qco in his strategy, and thus v1 and c are bound to “miscoordi-
nate” at the voter’s second or third step. Since finite paths are not included
in the outcome sets, and the semantics in Section 3.3 rules out strategies with
empty outcomes, we get that ¬〈〈v1, c〉〉F voted1,a holds in the initial state of
IIS(ASV1,2), which is questionable. Worse still, it also holds that ¬〈〈v1, c〉〉F⊤,
which is downright strange.
Notice that removing the non-emptiness requirement from the semantic
clause in Section 3.3 does not help. In that case, any joint strategy of {v1, c}
could be used to demonstrate that 〈〈v1, c〉〉G⊥.
4.2 Solution: Adding Silent Transitions
One possible way out is to include finite maximal paths in the outcome sets of
strategies. However, the interpretation of strategic modalities over finite paths
is rather nonstandard [8]. Another option is to augment the system with special
“silent” transitions, labeled by ǫ, that are fired whenever no “real” transition
can occur. In our case, the ǫ-transitions will account for the possibility that
some agents miscoordinate and thus block the system. Moreover, we redefine
the outcome set of a strategy so that an ǫ-transition is taken whenever such
miscoordination occurs.
Definition 4.3 [Undeadlocked IIS] Let S be an asynchronous MAS. Assume
that no agent in S has ǫ in its alphabet of events. The undeadlocked model of S,
denoted Mǫ = IISǫ(S), extends the canonical model M = IIS(S) as follows:
• EvtMǫ = EvtM ∪ {ǫ};
• For each g ∈ St, we add the transition g
ǫ
−→ g iff there is a selection of agents’
choices −→α Agt = (α1, . . . , αk), αi ∈ Pai(g), such that enabledM(g,
−→α Agt) = ∅.
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In that case, we also fix enabledMǫ(g,
−→α Agt) = {ǫ}.
In other words, “silent” loops are added in the states where a combination of
the agents’ actions can block the system.
The notion of a path is defined as in Section 2.2. The following is trivial.
Proposition 4.4 For any AMAS S, any state g ∈ IISǫ(S), and any strategy
σA, we have that enabledIISǫ(S)(g, σA(state)) 6= ∅.
Example 4.5 For the strategy in Example 4.1, notice that its out-
come in the undeadlocked model contains two infinite paths, namely
(000 giveup 002 giveup 002 . . .) and (000 proceed 101 ǫ 101 . . .) . Since the lat-
ter path invalidates the temporal formula G¬open, we get that Mconf , 000 6|=
〈〈1, 2〉〉G¬open, as expected.
Example 4.6 Similarly, we observe that formula ¬〈〈v1, c〉〉F⊤ does not hold
anymore in the undeadlocked model of ASV1,2, because the joint strategies of
{v1, c} have nonempty outcomes in IISǫ(ASV1,2).
On the other hand, 〈〈v1, c〉〉F voted1,a still does not hold. Note, however, that
〈〈v1〉〉F voted1,a does not hold anymore either, i.e., the voter cannot effectively
cast a vote for a (neither on her own, nor with the collaboration of the coercer).
We will come back to the issue in Section 6.
5 Liveness and Fair Paths in Outcomes of Strategies
The solution proposed in Section 4.2 is based on the assumption that an agent
is free to choose any event in its protocol – even one that prevents the system
from executing anything. This is conceptually consistent with the usual notion
of agency [9]. The downside is that, for most systems, only safety properties can
hold (i.e., properties using the temporal operator G ). For reachability, there
is usually a combination of the opponents’ actions that blocks the execution
early on, and prevents the system from reaching the goal of the coalition.
This is similar to temporal properties of asynchronous systems without
concurrency-fairness (CF). Then, reachability fails because the system can
ignore the selected actions forever. In practice, one often assumes that the
system cannot consistently ignore an agent whose action is enabled infinitely
often (i.e, adopts CF). In this section, we define an analogous condition for
the interplay between the proponents’ and the opponents’ choices, that we
call the enforced liveness. We also show a technical construction that obtains
the concept of ability in enforced-live paths of undeadlocked models without
changing the execution semantics of AMAS. Finally, we discuss issues related
to the original CF condition, and propose how it should be reformulated in the
context of strategic reasoning.
5.1 Enforced Liveness
Below, we propose a fairness-style condition that restricts the possible execu-
tions so that the agents in the coalition cannot be stalled forever by miscoor-
dination on the part of the opponents.
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qǫ0ǫ
Fig. 4. The auxiliary agent added in ASVǫ1,2
Definition 5.1 [Enforced liveness] A path π = g0α0g1α1g2 . . . in IIS
ǫ(S)
satisfies enforced liveness for strategy σA iff enabled(gn, σA(gn)) 6= {ǫ} implies
αn 6= ǫ. In other words, whenever the agents outside A have a way to proceed,
they must proceed. The enforced-live outcome (EL-outcome in short) of σA in
state g, denoted outEL(g, σA), is the restriction of out(g, σA) to its enforced-live
paths.
Proposition 5.2 The ǫ-transitions in outEL
IISǫ(S)(g, σA) can only occur in an
infinite sequence at the end of a path.
Proof. Take any π = g0α0g1α1g2 · · · ∈ out
EL
IISǫ(S)(g, σA) such that ǫ oc-
curs on π, and let i be the first position on π such that αi = ǫ. By EL,
we get that enabled(gi, σA(gi)) = {ǫ}. Moreover, statei+1 = gi, hence also
enabled(gi+1, σA(gi+1)) = {ǫ}. Thus, αi+1 = ǫ. It follows by straightforward
induction that αj = ǫ for every j ≥ i. ✷
5.2 Encoding Deadlock-Freeness and Enforced Liveness in AMAS
If we adopt the assumption of enforced liveness for coalition A, there is an
alternative, technically simpler way to obtain the same semantics of strategic
ability as in Section 4.2. The idea is to introduce the “silent” transitions already
at the level of the AMAS, as proposed below.
Definition 5.3 [Undeadlocked AMAS] The undeadlocked variant of S is con-
structed from S by adding an auxiliary agent Aǫ with Lǫ = {qǫ0}, ιǫ = q
ǫ
0,
Evt ǫ = {ǫ}, Pǫ(qǫ0) = {ǫ}, Ti(q
ǫ
0, ǫ) = q
ǫ
0, and PVǫ = ∅. In other words, we add
a module with a single local state and a “silent” loop labeled by ǫ. We will
denote the undeadlocked variant of S by Sǫ.
Example 5.4 [ASV] The auxiliary agent for ASVǫ1,2 can be found in Figure 4.
Proposition 5.5 The ǫ-transitions in outEL
IIS(Sǫ)(g, σA) can only occur in an
infinite sequence at the end of a path.
Proof. Analogous to Proposition 5.2. ✷
We show now that, under the assumption of enforced liveness, the view
of A’s strategic ability in the undeadlocked AMAS S corresponds precisely to
A’s abilities in the undeadlocked IIS(S). This allows to deal with deadlocks
and finite paths without redefining the execution semantics for AMAS, set in
Definition 2.4.
Theorem 5.6 For every strategy σA in S, we have that
outEL
IISǫ(S)(g, σA) = out
EL
IIS(Sǫ)(g, σA).
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Proof. outEL
IISǫ(S)(g, σA) ⊆ out
EL
IIS(Sǫ)(g, σA): Consider any π =
g0α0g1α1g2 · · · ∈ out
EL
IISǫ(S)(g, σA). We have two cases:
(i) There are no ǫ-transitions on π. In that case, π ∈ outELIIS(S)(g, σA) ⊆
outEL
IIS(Sǫ)(g, σA), QED.
(ii) π includes ǫ-transitions, with αi being the first ǫ-transition on π. Then,
for every j < i, we have αj 6= ǫ and αj ∈ enabledIISǫ(S)(gj , σA(gj)), hence
also αj ∈ enabledIIS(S)(gj , σA(gj)) ⊆ enabledIIS(Sǫ)(gj , σA(gj)). (*)
Moreover, for every j ≥ i, we have gj = gi and αj = ǫ (by
Proposition 5.2). By EL, enabledIISǫ(S)(gj , σA(gj)) = {ǫ}, and hence
enabledIIS(S)(gj , σA(gj)) = ∅ and enabledIIS(Sǫ)(gj , σA(gj)) = {ǫ}. (**)
Thus, by (*) and (**), π ∈ outEL
IIS(Sǫ)(g, σA), QED.
outEL
IIS(Sǫ)(g, σA) ⊆ out
EL
IISǫ(S)(g, σA): Analogous. ✷
5.3 Paradox of Concurrency-Fairness
In Section 3, Definition 3.4, we quoted the definition of concurrency-fair out-
come from [30]. The idea was to remove from out(g, σA) those paths that
consistently ignore agents whose events are enabled at the level of the whole
model. Unfortunately, this does not work for paths that end in a deadlock when
a given strategy is executed.
Proposition 5.7 Consider an AMAS S and a path π in IISǫ(S) such that,
from some point i on, π includes only ǫ-transitions. Then, for every strategy
σA in S, we have that π /∈ out
CF
IISǫ(S)(g, σA).
Proof. Take π as above, i.e., π = g0α0g1α1 . . . giǫgiǫgi . . . . Since the transition
function in IISǫ(S) is total, there must be some event β 6= ǫ enabled in gi.
In consequence, β is always enabled from i on, but none of its “owners” in
Agent(β) executes an event on π after i. Hence, π does not satisfy CF, and
does not belong to outCF
IISǫ(S)(g, σA) for any strategy σA. ✷
In other words, the CF condition eliminates all the finite executions from
the outcome of a strategy. In consequence, it brings back all the problems
that we identified in Section 4.1, and showed how to overcome in Section 4.2.
Moreover, combining the two kinds of fairness (CF and EL) collapses the
undeadlocked execution semantics altogether, see the proposition below.
Proposition 5.8 Let us define the (EL,CF)-outcome of σA in IIS
ǫ(S) as
outEL,CF
IISǫ(S)(g, σA) = out
EL
IISǫ(S)(g, σA) ∩ Π
CF
M (g). For any AMAS S and any
strategy σA in S, we have that out
EL,CF
IISǫ(S)(g, σA) = out
CF
IIS(S)(g, σA).
Proof. Clearly, outCFIIS(S)(g, σA) ⊆ out
EL,CF
IISǫ(S)(g, σA), since out
EL,CF
IISǫ(S)(g, σA)
can only add to outCF
IIS(S)(g, σA) new paths that include ǫ-transitions.
For the other direction, take any π ∈ outEL,CF
IISǫ(S)(g, σA), and suppose that it
contains an ǫ-transition. By Proposition 5.2, it must have an infinite suffix con-
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sisting only of ǫ-transitions. Then, by Proposition 5.7, π /∈ outCF
IISǫ(S)(g, σA),
which leads to a contradiction. Thus, π contains only transitions from IIS(S),
and hence π ∈ outCFIIS(S)(g, σA), QED. ✷
How should fair paths be properly defined for strategic reasoning? The
answer is simple: in relation to the outcome of the strategy being executed.
Definition 5.9 [Strategic CF] Path π = g0α0g1α1g2 . . . is concurrency-fair
for strategy σA and state g iff there is no event α such that, for some n and
all i ≥ n, we have α ∈ enabled(π[i], σA(π[i])) and Agent(α) ∩ Agent(αi) = ∅.
That is, no agent with an event always enabled by σA can be ignored forever.
The SCF-outcome of σA ∈ ΣirA is defined as out
SCF
M (g, σA) = {π ∈
outM (g, σA) | π is concurrency-fair for σA, g}.
6 More Paradoxes: Strategies in Asymmetric Interaction
AMAS and IIS follow the modeling tradition of distributed systems and their
verification in temporal logic. However, the semantics of strategic properties
differs from purely temporal ones in that it is essentially asymmetric. It asks
if a subset of agents A has a strategy that cuts out a subtree of paths with
a particular temporal pattern. Thus, A are free to put forward a strategy
that will influence the way the other agents can react, similarly to Stackelberg
games [46]. In case of asynchronous systems, this can lead to further paradoxes.
Example 6.1 Consider the asynchronous simple voting of Example 4.2, and
assume the condition of enforced liveness (Definition 5.1). Clearly, it holds that
〈〈v1〉〉G(¬revealed1,a∧¬revealed1,b), meaning that the voter is free to never reveal
any certificate. This is achieved by v1 selecting ng1 at states q
1
a and q
1
b . Then,
the next transition can be obtained only if the coercer module synchronizes
with v1 on event ng1. On the other hand, we also have that 〈〈c〉〉F revealed1,a,
which is obtained by the coercer selecting gv1,a at q
c
0. Then, an infinite path
can be only produced if the voter synchronizes on the same event.
The latter is clearly strange: the coercer should not make the voter vote for
candidate a by simply refusing to accept anything but the certificate for a.
The problem arises because asynchronous MAS allow only to represent sym-
metric synchronization. This means that the agents in 〈〈A〉〉 who choose the
strategy can push the other agents to respond accordingly. Unfortunately, there
is no way to model the converse situation, i.e., when the agents in A are forced
by the choices of their opponents. Indeed, looking closer at the AMAS in Ex-
ample 4.2, we can see that the communication of the voting certificate (or the
voter’s refusal to show it) is modeled in a symmetric way, while in reality it
is the voter who chooses what “message” is sent to the coercer, and not vice
versa. The coercer module should duly follow the choice of the voter.
To deal with the problem, we extend the representations so that one can
model who controls the choice between transitions.
Definition 6.2 [AMAS with Extended Protocols] Everything is exactly as in
Definition 2.1, except for the local protocols which are now functions Pi :
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Li → 2
2Evti \ ∅. That is, Pi(l) lists nonempty subsets of events X1, X2, · · · ⊆
Evt i, each capturing an available choice at state l. If the agent chooses Xj =
{α1, α2, . . .}, then only an event in that set can be executed within the agent’s
module; however, the agent has no firmer control over which one will be fired. 3
Accordingly, we assume that Ti(l, α) is defined iff α ∈
⋃
Pi(l).
4
Notice that the simple AMAS of Definition 2.1 can be seen as a special case
where Pi(l) is always a list of singletons. The definitions of IIS, canonical IIS,
and undeadlocked IIS stay the same, as the protocols are not actually used to
generate the unfolding of S. Moreover, undeadlocked AMAS with extended
protocols can be obtained analogously to Definition 5.3 by adding the auxiliary
“epsilon”-agent with Pǫ(q
ǫ
0) = {{ǫ}} in its sole local state.
Strategies still assign choices to local states; hence, the type of agent i’s
strategies is now σi : Li → 2Evti \ ∅ s.t. σi(l) ∈ Pi(l). The definition of the
outcome set is also updated accordingly by assuming that, for σi(l) = Xj =
{α1, α2, . . .}, any event in Xj can be executed by agent i at state l, see below.
Definition 6.3 [Outcome sets for AMAS with extended protocols] First, we
lift the set of events enabled by −→αA = (α1, . . . , αm) at g to match the new type
of protocols and strategies. Formally, β ∈ enabled(g,−→α A) iff: (1) for every
ai ∈ Agent(β) ∩ A, we have β ∈ αai , and (2) for every i ∈ Agent(β) \ A, it
holds that β ∈
⋃
Pi(g
i).
Now, the outcome, EL-outcome, and SCF-outcome of σA in state g of
model M are given as in Definitions 3.3, 5.1, and 5.9.
Example 6.4 [Improved ASV] We improve our voting model by assuming pro-
tocols Pi(q
i
0) = {{votei,1}, . . . , {votei,n}}, Pi(q
i
j) = {{gvi,j}, {ngi}}, etc., and
Pc(q
c
0) = {{gv1,1, . . . , gv1,n, ng1, stop1 . . . , gvk,1, . . . , gvk,n, ngk, stopk}}. That
is, the voters behave as before, and the coercer “listens” to the choices of the
voters. Clearly, 〈〈c〉〉F revealed1,a does not hold anymore in the new AMAS.
Note also that both 〈〈v1〉〉F voted1,a and 〈〈v1, c〉〉F voted1,a hold for the im-
proved ASV, with and without the enforced liveness assumption.
It is easy to see that Proposition 5.2, Proposition 5.5, and Theorem 5.6 still
hold for the extended notion of protocols in AMAS.
7 Partial Order Reduction Still Works
Partial order reduction (POR) has been defined for temporal and temporal-
epistemic logics without “next” [38,41,23,33]. Recently, we showed how to
extend it to strategic specifications [30]. The idea is to generate reduced models
that satisfy exactly the same formulas as the full model. Essentially, POR
removes paths that change only the interleaving order of an “irrelevant” event
with another event. Importantly, the method generates the reduced model
directly from the representation, without generating the full model at all.
3 We note the similarity to effectivity functions [37] and alternating transition systems [4].
4 When X is a set of sets, we use
⋃
X to denote its “flattening”
⋃
x∈X x.
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Our main technical result in this respect is Theorem A.10 (see Appendix A).
Theorem A.10. Let M = IIS (Sǫ), and M ′ ⊆ M be the reduced model
generated by POR, parameterized by the independence relation IA,PV . For
each ATL∗ir formula ϕ over propositions PV , that refers only to coalitions
Aˆ ⊆ A and contains no nested strategic operators, we have:
M, ι |=
ir
ϕ iff M ′, ι′ |=
ir
ϕ.
In essence, the reduction algorithm in [30], defined for the flawed semantics
of ability, is still correct for the modified semantics that we have proposed
in Sections 4–6. The detailed definitions, algorithms and proofs are technical
(and rather tedious) adaptations of those in [30]. We omit them here for lack
of space, and refer the interested reader to Appendix A. In this section, we
explain how the reduction works on an example, which also serves to illustrate
the practical importance of the results.
Recall the voting scenario from Section 4. We take the undeadlocked
AMAS with extended protocols, specified in Examples 5.4 and 6.4, and as-
sume both the concurrency-fairness (CF) and the enforced liveness (EL) con-
ditions. The following formulas specify interesting properties of the benchmark.
〈〈vi〉〉F (votedi,a∧¬revealedi,a∧ revealedi,b) says that vi has a strategy so that, at
some point, she has voted for a and reveals a receipt with a vote for b. More-
over, 〈〈vi〉〉F
(
revealedi,b∧(¬revealedi,a)U (votedi,a∧¬revealedi,a)
)
expresses that
vi can to convince the coercer that she has voted for b, and then quietly vote
for a. Both formulas generate the same reduced model, shown in Figure 5.
The POR algorithm starts with the initial global state g0 = (q
1
0 , q
2
0 , q
c
0).
The set enabled(g0) contains all the voting transitions, but those belonging to
different agents are independent, and thus can be unfolded in an arbitrary order
(cf. Section A.3). Thus, the POR algorithm can choose {votei,a, votei,b}, for
an arbitrarily selected voter i, as the subset of events E(g0) that will be kept
in the reduced model. 5 Subsequently, transitions {givei,a, givei,b, ngi,a, ngi,b},
shared with the coercer, become enabled. There are several possible choices
of the ample set at this point. Practical implementations of POR, such as
the one in the model checker Spin [26], can preprocess the model to prioritise
checking the conditions C1−C3 on certain candidates for the ample set, such
as sets of transitions belonging to a single agent that are independent from
all the others (i.e., invisible and not shared). The set {votej,a, votej,b}, i.e.,
the voting transitions of the other voter j, is the preferable choice here, while
transitions shared with the coercer can be postponed until every vote has been
cast.
At g9 = (q
1
a, q
2
b , q
c
0), all the enabled transitions are shared between the co-
ercer and the voters. In consequence, the ample set must select all the available
events, i.e., E(g9) = enabled(g9). Similarly, at state g19 = (q
1
a,n, q
2
b , q
c
0), it is
not possible to reduce the set enabled(g19) = {stop1, gv2,b, ng2}, as removing
any transition would conflict with condition C1. The cases for the other states
5 In various papers on POR, the subset is called ample set, stubborn set, or persistent set.
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Fig. 5. A part of the IIS for ASV
{v1}
2,2 (down to depth 5). The reduced model
generated by POR is highlighted. For the sake of readability, we only expand a single
state g9 = (q
1
a, q
2
b , q
c
0) below depth 3.
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at the same depth are analogous.
The reduction fits intuition very well: the voting transitions by different
voters are independent from one another, so their order is irrelevant. In the
reduced model, all the voting transitions occur first in an arbitrary order, re-
sulting in Σki=0n
i = n
k+1
−1
n−1 = O(n
k) states. Meanwhile, the full model addi-
tionally allows for interleavings of transitions gvi,j and ngi with votei,j , i.e.,
O(nk) · O(nk) states. Thus, up to depth k, the reduced model is O(nk) times
smaller. As k (the number of voters) is typically large, this provides a clear
computational advantage for model checking.
8 Conclusions
In this paper, we reconsider the asynchronous semantics of strategic ability
for multi-agent systems, proposed recently in [30]. We show that the mod-
eling machinery and execution semantics, inherited from distributed systems,
leads to paradoxes. We identify two sources of such paradoxes. On one hand,
the execution semantics does not handle reasoning about deadlock-inducing
strategies well. On the other hand, the class of models does not allow for rep-
resenting asymmetric synchronization where one agent has more control over
the outcome of an event than the other participants of the event.
To deal with the former problem, we change the execution semantics of
strategies in asynchronous MAS by adding “silent” ǫ-transitions in situations
where no “real” event can be executed. For the latter, we allow for nondeter-
ministic choices in agents’ protocols. Additionally, we look at the partial order
reduction scheme for strategic abilities, proposed in [30]. The modification of
representations and the execution semantics of strategies means that the cor-
rectness of POR must be established anew. As it turns out, the most efficient
variant of POR, defined almost 30 years ago for linear-time logic, still works.
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A Partial Order Reduction: Details
All the results in this appendix are formulated and proved for the semantics of
ATLir over undeadlocked AMAS with extended protocols. under the assump-
tion of enforced liveness (EL). Also, we restrict the formulas to ATL∗ without
nested strategic modalities and the next step operator X (“simple ATL∗”, or
sATL∗). As noted in [30], sATL∗ is sufficient for most practical specifications
and much more expressive than LTL. Yet, as we prove below, it enjoys the
same efficiency of partial-order reduction.
We begin by introducing the relevant notions of equivalence, and proposing
conditions on reduced models that preserve the equivalences. Then, we show a
class of algorithms that generate such models, and prove their correctness.
It should be stressed that the reduction scheme proposed here is general,
in the sense that it preserves equivalent representatives of all the enforced-
live paths in the model. In particular, we do not propose a variant of POR,
optimized for strategic concurrency-fair paths, analogous to reductions of [38]
for CF. A variant of POR for sATLir under SCF is planned for future work.
A.1 Properties of Submodels
Given an undeadlocked AMAS Sǫ, partial order reduction attempts to generate
only a subset of states and transitions that is sufficient for verification of Sǫ,
i.e., a relevant submodel of IIS (Sǫ).
Definition A.1 [Submodel] Let M,M ′ be two models extending the same
AMAS Sǫ, such that St′ ⊆ St, ι ∈ St′, T is an extension of T ′, and V ′ = V |St′ .
Then, we write M ′ ⊆M and call M ′ a submodel of M .
Note that, for each g ∈ St′, we have ΠM ′ (g) ⊆ ΠM (g).
Lemma A.2 Let M ′ ⊆M , A ∈ Agt, σA ∈ ΣirA. Then, we have out
EL
M ′ (ι, σA) =
outELM (ι, σA) ∩ ΠM ′(ι).
Proof. Note that each joint ir-strategy in M is also a well defined ir-joint strat-
egy in M ′ as it is defined on the local states of each agent of an AMAS which is
extended by both M and M ′. The lemma follows directly from the definition
of EL-outcome (Def. 5.1 and 6.3), plus the fact that ΠM ′ (ι) ⊆ ΠM (ι). 
Lemma A.3 Let M be a model, π, π′ ∈ ΠM (ι), and for some i ∈ Agt :
Evt(π) |Evti= Evt(π
′) |Evti . Then, for each ir-strategy σi, we have π ∈
outELM (ι, σi) iff π
′ ∈ outELM (ι, σi).
Proof. Let Evt(π) |Evti= b0b1 . . . be the sequence of the events of agent i in π.
For each bj let π[bj ] denote the global state from which bj is executed in π. By
induction we can show that for each j ≥ 0, we have π[bj ]
i = π′[bj]
i. For j = 0 it
is easy to see that π[b0]
i = π[b0]
i = ιi. Assume that the thesis holds for j = k.
The induction step follows from the fact the local evolution Ti is a function,
so if π[bk]
i = π′[bk]
i = l for some l ∈ Li, then π[bk+1]i = π′[bk+1]i = Ti(l, bk).
Thus, by Def. 5.1 and 6.3, for each ir-strategy σi we have π ∈ out
EL
M (ι, σi) iff
π′ ∈ outELM (ι, σi), which concludes the proof. 
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Lemma A.3 can be easily generalized to joint strategies σA ∈ ΣirA.
A.2 Stuttering Equivalence
LetM be a model,M ′ ⊆M , and PV ⊆ PV a subset of propositions. Stuttering
equivalence says that two paths can be divided into corresponding finite seg-
ments, each satisfying exactly the same propositions. Stuttering path equiva-
lence 6 requires two models to always have corresponding, stuttering-equivalent
paths.
Definition A.4 [Stuttering equivalence] Two paths π ∈ ΠM (ι) and π′ ∈
ΠM ′(ι) are stuttering equivalent, denoted π ≡s π′, if there exists a partition
B0 = (π[0], . . . , π[i1 − 1]), B1 = (π[i1], . . . , π[i2 − 1]), . . . of the states of π,
and an analogous partition B′0, B
′
1, . . . of the states of π
′, s.t. for each j ≥ 0 :
Bj and B
′
j are nonempty and finite, and V (g) ∩ PV = V
′(g′) ∩ PV for every
g ∈ Bj and g′ ∈ B′j .
Models M and M ′ are stuttering path equivalent, denoted M ≡s M ′ if for
each path π ∈ ΠM (ι), there is a path π
′ ∈ ΠM ′(ι) such that π ≡s π
′. 7
Theorem A.5 ([17]) If M ≡s M
′, then we have M, ι |= ϕ iff M ′, ι′ |= ϕ, for
any LTL−X formula ϕ over PV .
A.3 Independence of Events
Intuitively, an event is invisible iff it does not change the valuations of the
propositions. 8 Additionally, we can designate a subset of agents A whose
events are visible by definition. Furthermore, two events are independent iff
they are not events of the same agent and at least one of them is invisible.
Definition A.6 [Invisible events] Consider a model M , a subset of agents
A ⊆ Agt, and a subset of propositions PV ⊆ PV . An event α ∈ Evt is invisible
wrt. A and PV if Agent(α) ∩ A = ∅ and for each two global states g, g′ ∈ St
we have that g
α
−→ g′ implies V (g)∩PV = V (g′)∩PV . The set of all invisible
events for A,PV is denoted by InvisA,PV , and its closure – of visible events –
by V isA,PV = Evt \ InvisA,PV .
Definition A.7 [Independent events] The notion of independence IA,PV ⊆
Evt×Evt is defined as: IA,PV = {(α, α′) ∈ Evt×Evt | Agent(α)∩Agent(α′) =
∅} \ (V isA,PV ×V isA,PV ). Events α, α′ ∈ Evt are called dependent if (α, α′) 6∈
IA,PV . If it is clear from the context, we omit the subscript PV .
6 The property is usually called stuttering trace equivalence [17]. We use a slightly different
name to avoid confusion with Mazurkiewicz traces, also used in this paper.
7 Typically, the definition contains also the symmetric condition which in our case always
holds for M and its submodel M ′, as ΠM′(ι) ⊆ ΠM (ι).
8 This concept of invisibility is technical, and is not connected to the view of any agent in
the sense of [36].
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A.4 Preserving Stuttering Equivalence
Rather than generating the full modelM = IIS (Sǫ), one can generate a reduced
model M ′ satisfying the following property:
AEA : ∀σA∈Σ
ir
A ∀π∈out
EL
M (ι, σA) ∃π
′∈outELM ′ (ι, σA) . π≡sπ
′.
We define a class of algorithms that generate reduced models satisfying
either AEA (Section A.4.1), and then prove that these models preserve sATL
∗
ir
(Section A.4.2).
A.4.1 Algorithms for Partial Order Reduction
POR is used to reduce the size of models while preserving satisfaction for a
class of formulas. The standard DFS [23] or DDFS [18] is modified in such a
way that from each visited state g an event α to compute the successor state g1
such that g
α
→ g1, is selected from E(g)∪{ǫ} such that E(g) ⊆ enabled(g)\{ǫ}.
That is, the algorithm always selects ǫ, plus a subset of the enabled events at
g. Let A ⊆ Agt. The conditions on the heuristic selection of E(g) given below
are inspired by [39,17,30].
C1 Along each path π in M that starts at g, each event that is dependent
on an event in E(g) cannot be executed in π without an event in E(g) is
executed first in π. Formally, ∀π ∈ ΠM (g) such that π = g0α0g1α1 . . . with
g0 = g, and ∀b ∈ Evt such that (b, c) /∈ IA for some c ∈ E(g), if αi = b for
some i ≥ 0, then αj ∈ E(g) for some j < i.
C2 If E(g) 6= enabled(g) \ {ǫ}, then E(g) ⊆ InvisA.
C3 For every cycle in M ′ containing no ǫ-transitions, there is at least one
node g in the cycle for which E(g) = enabled(g) \ {ǫ}, i.e., for which all the
successors of g are expanded.
Theorem A.8 Let A ⊆ Agt, M = IIS (Sǫ), and M ′ ⊆M be the reduced model
generated by DFS with the choice of E(g′) for g′ ∈ St′ given by conditions C1,
C2, C3 and the independence relation IA. Then, M
′ satisfies AEA.
Proof. Let M ′ ⊆ M = IIS(Sǫ) be the reduced model generated as specified.
Notice that the reduction of M under the conditions C1, C2, C3 above is
equivalent to the reduction of M without the ǫ-loops under the conditions C1,
C2, C3 of [39], and then adding the ǫ-loops to all the states of the reduced
model. Although the setting is slightly different, it can be shown similarly
to [17, Theorem 12] that the conditions C1, C2, C3 guarantee that the mod-
els: (i) M without ǫ-loops and (ii) M ′ without ǫ-loops are stuttering path
equivalent. More precisely, for each path π = g0a0g1a1 · · · with g0 = ι (with-
out ǫ-transitions) in M there is a stuttering equivalent path π′ = g′0a
′
0g
′
1a
′
1 · · ·
with g′0 = ι (without ǫ-transitions) inM
′ such that Evt(π)|V isA = Evt(π
′)|V isA ,
i.e., π and π′ have the same maximal sequence of visible events for A. (*)
We will now prove that this implies M ≡s M ′. Removing the ǫ-loops
fromM eliminates two kinds of paths: (a) paths with infinitely many “proper”
events, and (b) paths ending with an infinite sequence of ǫ-transitions. Consider
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a path π of type (a) from M . Notice that the path π1, obtained by removing
the ǫ-transitions from π, is stuttering-equivalent to π. Moreover, by (*), there
exists a path π2 in M
′ without ǫ-transitions, which is stuttering-equivalent to
π1. By transitivity of the stuttering equivalence, we have that π2 is stuttering
equivalent to π. Since π2 must also be a path in M
′, this concludes this part
of the proof.
Consider a path π of type (b) fromM , i.e., π ends with an infinite sequence
of ǫ-transitions. Let π1 be the sequence obtained from π after removing ǫ-
transitions, and π2 be any infinite path without ǫ-transitions such that π1 is its
prefix. Then, it follows from (*) that there is a stuttering equivalent path π′2 =
g′0a
′
0g
′
1a
′
1 · · · with g
′
0 = ι in M
′ such that Evt(π2)|V isA = Evt(π
′
2)|V isA . Con-
sider the minimal finite prefix π′1 of π
′
2 such that Evt(π
′
1)|V isA = Evt(π1)|V isA .
Clearly, π′1 is a sequence in M
′ and can be extended with an infinite number of
ǫ-transitions to the path π′ in M ′. It is easy to see that π and π′ are stuttering
equivalent.
So far, we have shown that our reduction under the conditions C1, C2,
C3 guarantees that the models M and M ′ are stuttering path equivalent, and
more precisely that for each path π = g0a0g1a1 · · · with g0 = ι in M there
is a stuttering equivalent path π′ = g′0a
′
0g
′
1a
′
1 · · · with g
′
0 = ι in M
′ such that
Evt(π)|V isA = Evt(π
′)|V isA , i.e., π and π
′ have the same maximal sequence
of visible events for A. To show that M ′ satisfies AEA, consider an ir-joint
strategy σA and π ∈ outELM (ι, σA). As demonstrated above, there is π
′ ∈ ΠM ′ (ι)
such that π ≡s π′ and Evt(π)|V isA = Evt(π
′)|V isA . Since Evt i ⊆ V isA for each
i ∈ A, the same sequence of events of each Evt i is executed in π and π′. Thus, by
the generalization of Lemma A.3 to ir-joint strategies we get π′ ∈ outELM (ι, σA).
So, by Lemma A.2 we have π′ ∈ outELM ′ (ι, σA). 
Algorithms generating reduced models, in which the choice of E(g) is given
by similar conditions, can be found for instance in [39,38,17,23,41,33].
A.4.2 Correctness of Reductions Satisfying AEA
We show that the reduced models satisfying AEA preserve sATL
∗
ir.
Theorem A.9 Let A ⊆ Agt and M ′ ⊆ M satisfy AEA. For each sATL∗ir
formula ϕ over PV , that refers only to coalitions Aˆ ⊆ A, we have: M, ι |=
ir
ϕ
iff M ′, ι′ |=
ir
ϕ.
Proof. In the proof of [30, Theorem 5.8], we replace and “Theorem 5.3” with
“Theorem A.5”. 
Together with Theorem A.8, we obtain the following.
Theorem A.10 Let M = IIS(Sǫ), and M ′ ⊆ M be the reduced model gener-
ated by DFS with the choice of E(g′) for g′ ∈ St′ given by conditions C1, C2,
C3 and the independence relation IA,PV . For each sATL
∗
ir formula ϕ over
PV , that refers only to coalitions Aˆ ⊆ A, we have:
M, ι |=
ir
ϕ iff M ′, ι′ |=
ir
ϕ.
This concludes the proof that the adaptation of POR for LTL−X to sATL
∗
ir,
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originally presented in [30], remains sound in the updated semantics proposed
in Sections 4 and 6. That is, the structural condition AEA is sufficient to
obtain correct reductions for sATL∗ir under the new enforced liveness assump-
tion (Theorem A.10). Thanks to that, one can potentially reuse or adapt the
existing POR algorithms and tools for LTL−X, and the actual reductions are
likely to be substantial.
